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BOOK NOTES
PRODUCTS LIABILITY IN THE AUTOMOBILE INDUSTRY. By Cornelius W. Gillam. Minneapolis: University of
Minnesota Press, 1960. 239 pages. $4.75.
This book is a study of the products liability of automobile manufacturers, the legal and eccnomic basis of
this liability, its meaning to business management, and
the measures which should be taken for its refinement.'
This brief but inclusive introduction by Gillam puts the
reader not only in perspective for the book, but for the examination of this review.
The short introduction into "products liability" by the
author acquaints us with the classic Winterbottom case, the
beginning of the modern exploration of the problem of products liability. This case held that tort liability for product defects ran only to those with whom the defendant was in privity of contract. This clearly illustrates the doctrine of caveat
emptor.
Early in the study we are introduced with complacency
to an exception to the privity rule, the leading MacPherson
case,' which marks a new era in products liability; the beginning of caveat venditor. A synopsis of the social and economic
background of the manufacturer-consumer relationship as
well as characteristic features of the auto industry prepares
us for the author's minute examination of the topic.
Mr. Gillam's exhaustive exploration of the legal background
brings us one-third of the way into the text. Although considerating this introductory material excessive, I don't believe
the superlative discussion impaired the main subject matter;
that of products liability in the auto industry.
The privity rule in products liability of automobile manufacturers is attacked on three fronts by the author. These are
fraud, negligence and warranty. Mr. Gillam concludes,
On the first (fraud) privity has been routed; on the
second (negligence) it is in full retreat. The struggle for
warranty without contract still remains in doubt, although time seems to be on its side.'
1.

GILLAM PRODUCTS LIABILITY IN THE AUTOMOBILE INDUSTRY,

Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press (1960) at 3.
2. Winterbottom v. Wright, 10 M. & W. 109, 152 Eng. Rep. 402, 11 L.
J. Ex. 415 (1942).
3. MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916).
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Through his discussion it is evident that the author emphatically favors expansion of the rule of liability for manufacturers. He thoroughly examines products liability for specific defects in vehicles, such as design, chassis, engine, etc.,
and dissects this group and discusses the ramification of each
division. The liability of the manufacturers and parts manufacturers is considered as well as the damages recoverable.
Although sketchy in certain instances, Mr. Gillam's inquiry
into the problems of pleading and proof for both the defendant and plaintiff should be a valuable tool to the practicing
attorney. The practicability of this section is evident.
In concluding, Gillam exemplifies the metamorphosis of
the products liability law by stating, "caveat emptor has become caveat venditor,"' although he later qualifies this remark.! Some results of the transition. mentioned are higher
standards on the part of manufacturers and greater accuracy
and authenticity in advertising by automobile manufacturers.
An interesting analysis of disclaimers pointed out the principle features of present automobile warranties in which "the
practical effect of all this (manufacturer's warranties) is to
put the consumer at the manufacturer's mercy.'" In essence,
the standard warranty holds the manufacturer liable for no
more than discretionary replacement of parts within the warranted period.
However, a completely astonishing legal phenomenon is conspicuously perceptible at this point. The standard warranty of
the manufacturer has never been used as a defense in an
action for personal injury causes by dangerous defects in vehicles. It appears policy consideration involving the "consuming public" is the manufacturer's allurement to full legal responsibility for losses from defects. It is quite evident, however, that the consumer ultimately bears the cost of this risk
in the disguise of the sale price. The court is definitely aware
of the policy impact when spreading the liability expense in
this matter.
The author's resties-ness indicates that although Cardozo's
MacPherson opinion' is still the monarch over a kingdom full
of litigation, the problems involved in products liability are
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.

Supra note 1 at 66.
Ibid. at 185.
Ibid. at 209, and commented
Ibid. at 191.
Supra note 2.

on later in this review.
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far from being solved. Solutions suggested are sidestepping
the privity rule completely in warranty cases and legislative
regulation of disclaimers.
One becomes confused as to the dominance of caveat venditor, when examining the last paragraph of the book: Gillarn
departs from earlier concluding statements by observing that
on the issues
the plaintiff still has the burden of proof "...
of the existence of a 'defect' in the technical sense, and of the
proximated causation of his injury by that defect."' Based
on this statement, Gillam subscribes to the idea that caveat
emptor survives. The entire theme of the conclusion is now
modified and colored by this dictum.
The table of contents of this work appears wholly inadequate and quite confusing. However, the excellent and comprehensive index and alphabetical and jurisdictional table of
cases outweighs the faulty listing of the various sections.
Mr. Gillham's greatest contribution to one exploring the
field of products liability is certainly the wealth of material
he offers to his readers through the footnotes. Not only are
the notes satisfactory in all respects, the quantity and volume
of reference material is outstanding. For example, he gives
general references in the footnotes for various topic headlines;
one" included 49 law review articles, 16 case and text books,
39 law review notes and 12 ALR citations. Other notes are
as extensive.
Material referred to in the notes both support and oppose
the author's conclusions. Most of the notes are explanatory in
nature and cases are usually briefly commented on. Authorities are cited for problems that are beyond the scope of the
book. Mr. Gillam certainly excels in the synthesizing of this
material concerning products liability in the automobile industry.
After researching the Minnesota and North Dakota cases
contained therein, I was confident that the author had not
only been careful in his selection of cases, but that he was
quite accurate in his observations. In a Minnesota case'1 the
volume number of the reporter was cited incorrectly, however
this was the only error found in the footnote material examined.
9. Supra note 1 at 204.
10. Ibid. at 30.
11. Ferraro v. Taylor, 197 Minn. 5, 265 N.W. 829 (1936).
case was erroneously cited as 65 N.W. 829.

The Ferraro
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An early North Dakota statute" was referred to as initial
legislation in the nation which gave buyers of farm machinery reasonable time to discover defects in the machinery. T7he
case cited supporting this enactment has been upheld to the
present day, with recent legislation" replacing the older statute. Other North Dakota cases examined accurately supported
the textual matter.
The research in this work is remarkably complete and the
material would serve as a fine reference guide for either lawyer or businessman. It will certainly satisfy all, lawman or
layman, who are concerned with products liability in the automobile industry.
JAMES D. SCHLOSSER
ADVERSE POSSESSION. By Charles C. Callahan. Ohio
State University Press, 1960, 111 pages. Price: $3.00
The Ohio State University School of Law annually sponsors
the Law Forum, a lecture series. The book under review, Adverse Possession, was originally presented as-a part of that
series by the author, Charles C. Callahan, in March, 1960.
The work was prepared for delivery primarily to law students. The impressions that follow are likewise those of a law
student. Professor Callahan has divided his book into three
sections. My remarks will generally follow that format.
The first six pages contain the facts in Van Valkenburgh
v. Lutz.This case involves mistaken boundary lines, a typical adverse possession fact situation. The opinion in this case,
which is not fully revealed, is apparently what troubles Professor Callahan because he states, "that all the talk in the
opinion between the statement of facts and the decision has
very little to do with the actual reasons for the decision." At
this point one feels that the following will contain a detailed
discussion of that opinion, pointing out the errors and attributes of the justice's handling of the situation. However,
the subject rather abruptly changes' to a discussion of the
evolutionary process operating in the field of property law,
i. e., the dissolution of doctrines, the merger of some theories
12.
13.

N.D. Rev. Stat. § 5991a, 5993a (1913).
N.D. Cent. Code § 51-07-07 (1961).

1. 304 N.Y. 95, 106 N.E. 2d 28 (1952, reh. den. 304 N.Y. 590, 107 N.E.2d
82 (1952).
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and the introduction of new concepts. One of the principle
ways in which property law is changing is simply a lack of
scholarship and understanding. By this the author does not
mean a lack of capacity to understand but a lack of time and
motivation to make inquiry. For instance, the Professor feels
that various and sundry technicalities of the requirements
prevent the judges from seeing the forest for the trees. Because of the pressure of the times, we are moving away from
the scholarly approach. Thus certain property law concepts are
becoming somewhat less than scholarly.
The remaining portion of this chapter deals with ownership
and possession and other basic concepts embodied in the property field. He defines, analyzes and questions. Aside from his
dextrous ability in writing and obvious proficiency in the
field, nevertheless, it is nothing more than any student should
hear in class from a professor of property law.
At this point the reader is likely to be confused, as I was.
The book began with six pages of facts; then an oblique discussion of the change that is occurring in property law. Not
illogical maybe, but it does make one wonder if a "meaty" discussion of adverse possession is going to follow as the title
of the book would indicate. At page forty-one (of a total of
one-hundred and eleven) we begin the second division titled,
"Adverse Possession: The Law."
This section begins with an outline of the history of the development of adverse possession. Throughout the remainder
of this the Professor does battle with the verbiage, logic and
the ultimate purpose of the concept of adverse possession.
Upon completing this portion of the book I felt that we had
arrived. The discussion was lively, logical and to the point.
The approach used signified sharp and original reflection upon
the problems involved. The challenge presented by this chapter often found one studying what was being said instead of
merely reading.
The assault upon the requirements that adverse possession
must be open, hostile, notorious and actual was particularly
interesting. Professor Callahan argues that these requirements are superfluous and presents a most persuasive case.
North Dakota does not require that possession be open, hostile. continuous, notorious and actual in so many words. Indeed, acts constituting adverse possession based upon a written instrument shall be deemed to have been so possessed and
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occupied in each of the following cases:' (1) when it has been
usually cultivated or improved; (2) when it has been protected by a substantial enclosure; (3) when, although not enclosed, it has been used for the supply of fuel or of fencing timber for the purposes of husbandry, or the ordinary use of the
occupant; or (4) when a known farm or a single lot has been
partly improved, the portion of such farm or lot that may
have been left not cleared or not enclosed according to the
usual course and custom of the adjoining country, shall be
deemed to have been occupied for the same length of time
as the part improved and cultivated, but when the premises
consists of two or more contiguous lots, the possession of one
lot shall not be deemed a possession of any other of such lots.'
Another statute actually confers title on one who has been
in the "actual open adverse and undisputed possession of land
under such title for a period of ten years."' This statute requires a claim under color of title and is not considered a
statute of limitation. The normal statutory period and requisites of adverse possession not under color of title are set out
in the chapter of the code previously alluded to.'
The concluding section, Question of Purpose, means just
what the title indicates. The Professor states that the law in
this regard does not know the why or wherefor of its existence. All questions concerning adverse possession must be
answered in terms of its purpose. Various theories have been
announced such as elimination of stale claims' and punishment
for not developing land.' The author would reject these and
suggest that its purpose may be the orderly transfer of land.
From the early statute of limitation enactment the theme has
apparently been orderly devolution of one's property. From a
social policy based on this premise, Professor Callahan infers
that this then is the true purpose of the doctrine.
The author encourages the trend towards simplification of
the rules of adverse possession. It is his feeling that such requirements as claim of right, state of mind, privity of tacking
and disabilities all break down under the weight of logical
2.

p. 8, the professor does ask a few searching questions.

3.

N.D. Cent. Code § 28-01-09 (1961).

4. N.D. Cent. Code § 28-01-11 (1961). when not based upon a written instrument only the first two requirements are needed.
Code 47-06-03
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Burby, Real Property (2d Ed. 1954).
Chester H. Smith. Real Property Survey (1956).
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analysis. Such simplifications as alluded to at the beginning
of this report would overcome the confusion that attends the
field of adverse possession today.
Throughout the book Professor Callahan is dissatisfied
with the reasoning that has been applied to the problems of
adverse possession. His criticism and suggestion are both
helpful and stimulate one's thinking with regard to the subject. Throughout the book I waited patiently for a thorough
discussion of the application of the law to the facts in the
Van Valkenburgh case. There was none. The recitation of the
facts in that case immediately caused me to begin thinking in
terms of adverse possession and this, conceivably, was the
purpose for their insertion at this point. However, aside from
that I saw no great need for their inclusion at all. Further,
the extensive treatment of basic material prior to the actual
discussion of adverse possession would lead one to believe that
the book is geared to readers not actually trained in the property law. This may be so.
The writing technique is such as to hold interest from beginning to end. Its use is for information and is recommended
for those students who plan to do academic writing in this
area. My general impression is that the subject matter is not
too difficult but the aggressive approach would also make for
interesting reading for the practitioner.
GENE C. GRINDELAND

